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ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC SECTOR
RESTRUCTURING IN JAPAN
C.R. McKenzie
This paper focuses on several aspects of economic deregulation, privatization and
amakudari. Two broad questions are raised with respect to deregulation: what is the expected
size of the macro-economic benefits; and whether the economic restructuring they induce are
of a first-order magnitude compared to 'naturally occurring'economic restructuring. With re-
spect to privatization, interest focuses on the issues of when in the privatization process do
efficiency gains occur; and what sort of bank一丘rm relationships are observed for the newly
privatised firms. The discussion of amakudari examines the impact of economic deregulation
and administrative reform on the supply of and demand for amakudan.
Keywords : Administrative reform; amakudari; deregulation; economic reform; efficiency;
privatisation.
* Associate Professor, Osaka School of I触tional Public Policy, Osaka University
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newly created agency.
1. Introduction Several deregulation plans have been an-
nounced in September 1993 (107 items), Feb-
Discussion of reform, both administrative ruary 1994 (798 items), July 1994 (308
and economic, currently holds centre stage in items), March 1995 (1091 items) and March
Japan. For example, Prime Minister Hashimoto　　1996 ( 569 items) covering a broad spectrum
has identified six key areas of reform: adminis-　　of industries including housing and land, trans-
trative reform, education reform, economic port, information and telecommunications, the
structural reform, financial system reform, fis-　　distribution system, finance, insurance and pol-
cal reform and social insurance reform, and has　　蝣Iution. According to the government's own self
foreshadowed the prospect of "big bangs" for evaluation, significant progress has been made
both the financial system and the bureaucracy.　towards implementing most of the proposals
The current debate in Japan on deregulation　　(see Management and Coordination Agency
and public restructuring rages over a broad　　(1996, Tables 3-3, 3-6, 3-7)). While many of
field and many issues. For example, deregula-　　the items might be criticized as being minor
tion proposals made by a task force of the Ad-　　　and technical in nature, some measures like re-
mimstrative Reform Committee in 1996 cover visions to the Large Department Store Law, the
a wide range of areas including financial serv-　　liberalization of imports of refined petroleum
ices, legal services, transportation, telecommu-　　products (see the Appendix for a brief empiri-
nications, and employment. Issues raised in the cal analysis) and the granting of permission for
recent debate on public sector restructuring in electric companies to buy power from outside
Japan have included: the hiring practices of sources have been viewed as being important
government ministries (centralized hiring vs　　(see OECD (1996)).
the current method of ministry by ministry hir-　　　　The discussion in this paper will focus on
ing) ; decentralization of administrative author-　　three aspects of this debate: economic deregula-
lty and revenue raising authority from the cen-　　　tion, privatization and amakudari. Two broad
tral government to local governments; increas-　　　questions are raised with respect to deregula-
ing the independence of the Bank of Japan; a tion: what is the expected size of the macro-
rationalization of the fiscal and investment economic benefits; and whether the economic
loan program (FILP) (see Tsuji (1996)); re-　　restructuring they induce are of a first-order
structuring the Ministry of Finance; and the ra-　　　magnitude compared to 'naturally occurring'
tionahzation and abolition of government cor-　　　economic restructuring. With respect to priva-
porations (tokushu hojin). The debate on re-　　　tization, interest focuses on the issues of when
structuring the Ministry of Finance has centred in the privatization process (including deregu-
on whether the Ministry of Finance should lation and new competition) do the efficiency
continue to have responsibility for the inspec-　　　gains occur; and what sort of bank-firm rela-
tion and supervision offinancial institutions or tionships do we observe for the newly
whether that responsibility should be given to a privatised firms. The discussion of amakudari
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examines the impact of economic deregulation value added in Japan was produced in regu-
and administrative reform on the supply of and lated" areas of the economy. Industries with a
demand for amakudari in the light of recent very high share of regulated areas include agrト
academic research in this area.　　　　　　　　　　culture, fisheries, forestry, mining, construe-
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2　　tion, finance, transport, electricity, gas and wa-
discusses economic restructuring and deregula-　　ter (see OECD ( 1995, p. 1 13)). These figures
tion. Two aspects of public sector restructuring,　probably grossly overestimate the impact of
privatization and amakudari, are examined in regulation since the existence of any law on
sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 con-　　pricing and/ or entry for an industrial category
tains some brief concluding remarks.　　　　　in the Input-Output Tables is treated as apply-
ing to the whole industry. In addition, the exis-
2. Economic Restructuring: 'Natural'and tence of formal regulation on pricing or entry
Deregulation Induced may have little or no effect or may be admims-
tered in such a way as to have little or no effect
The economist's standard simple analysis of as Flath (1996) suggests is the case for truck-
the impacts of effective regulation in the form ing and as Anderson (1996) suggests when he
of pricing rules or entry barriers is that the argues that effective regulation for airlines is
regulation causes higher prices, lower output quite different to the nominal regulation.
and deadweight losses. Depending on the re-　　　The EPA has estimated the impact of full
gime, managerial efficiencies leading to exces-　　implementation of the structural reforms pro-
sive use of labour and/or capital may also oc-　　　posed in the government's mid-term economic
cur. While income transfers between producers,　　plan (covering fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year
consumers, the government, factors of produc-　　2000) released in December 1995 to be the
tion (land and labour) or owners of factors of equivalent of a change in the annual average
production typically occur as a result of real growth rate of gross domestic product of
regulation/deregulation, from a macroeconomic 1.25% per annum over the 5 year period (see
perspective what is most important is the ag-　　Kaneko (1996)). Put differently, the cost of
gregate deadweight or welfare losses and gains not implementing the reforms in terms of for-
that are generated. If any of the agents are sub-　　　gone output over the five year period is some-
ject to liquidity constraints, the income trans-　　thing like 6% of GDP (assuming these growth
fers by relaxing or strengthening those con-　　　differences extend out further over time, the
straints may have an additional impact as well.　　net present value of the cost using any reason-
But what are the sizes of the losses generated?　　able discount rate would be far higher). Al-
Macro-Impact of Deregulation though structural reform might be expected to
If regulation in an industry is limited to pric-　　　reduce the growth rate of prices, the EPA esti-
ing regulation or entry barriers, the Japanese mates that consumer prices and wholesale
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) suggests prices would rise as a result of the structural re-
thatin 1993 something like 41% of the total form by 0.25%　and 0.5%　per annum,
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respectively. In June 1997, the Economic Plan-　　change (for example, the massive allocations
nmg Agency produced an updated estimate of to agriculture in the wake of the Uruguay
the macroeconomic impact of the reform pack-　　Round agreement). The experience of drastic
ages announced in December 1996, March economic reform in China, South America,
1997 and May 1997 (see Economic Planning Eastern Europe and Russia indicate cases
Agency (1997)). It estimated the impact of where there are large impacts (see, for exam-
these reform packages as being the equivalent pie, Edwards (1993), Rodrick (1996) and
of a change in the annual average real growth World 】〕ank (1996)) while the revolutionary
rate of gross domestic product of 0.9% per an-　　　New Zealand experience does not suggest sig-
num over the 5 year period from fiscal year nificant impacts in terms of economic growth
1998 to fiscal year2003. A failureto implement　　(see, for example, Evans et al. (1995) and
the reforms was estimated to lead to real gross Mulgan (1997)). My personal view is that
domestic product being 5.8% lower in 2003　　　when we examine the content of the屯ve year
than if the reforms were fully implemented.　　plan the numbers for the growth rates signifi-
Unlike the earlier EPA estimates, this time it cantly overestimate the likely impact of deregu-
was estimated that as a result of increases in lation, especially given the vague contents of
productivity consumer prices rises would be on the five year plan (Tsuji (1997) contains a
average 1.2% lower, and at the end of the five more positive evaluation of the Economic Plan-
year period the level of consumer prices would ning Agency's simulation).
be 7.3% lower if the reforms were imple-　　　　Koedijk and Kremers (1996) provide indi-
merited. A Ministry of International Trade and rect supportive evidence for significant positive
Industry Study Group estimated the growth impacts as a result of deregulation in
macroeconomic effect of economic reforms in their examination of the relationship between
five areas (including distribution, energy, fi-　　　economic growth (and productivity growth)
nance, and telecommunications) to lift real and measures of product market regulation and
GDP by 6.0% and reduce consumer prices by labour market regulation for European coun-
3.4%　by the year 2001.　　　　　　　　　　　　tries. Their statistical evidence strongly sug-
The macroeconomic impact of any deregula-　　　gests that there is a significantly significant
tion package is likely to depend on many fac-　　　negative relationship between growth (and
tors including: the size, scale and coverage of productivity growth) and product market
the package; the time period over which it is to regulation (and a less stronger relationship for
be implemented; the extent to which the econ-　　labour market regulation). Given that Japanese
omy has well developed and well functioning regulation is principally product regulation,
economic institutions and markets; the extent this also suggests a strong macroeconomic lm-
to which existing regulation actually bite (in pact of deregulation. One important limitation
the form of generating welfare losses rather of the study is that Koedijk and Kremers
than income transfers) ; and the extent to which　　( 1996) do not take into account any other fac-
attempts are made to cushion the adjustment to tors that may contribute to economic growth.
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It is worth noting that in the post-war period outcomes for Japan seem very large compared
Japan's highest rates of economic growth occur with these estimates.
in a period when product market regulation　　　'Natural Restructuring'
was perceived to be far more prevalent than it When restructuring is examined in Japan,
is today (see Ito (1992) for a summary dis-　　one is left wondering about the relative impor-
cussion of the factors contributing to Japan's tance of economic restructuring through natu-
high post war economic growth). Anecdotal ral economic forces and deregulation. Have
evidence on the economic experience in the economists been focusing their attention on the
United Kingdom going from a stagnant econ-　　　wrong thing? For example, the severe changes
omy prior to the election of Thatcher to a vi-　　in nominal and real exchange rates that have
brant economy following the reforms intro-　　　0ccurred since the shift to floating exchange
duced by the conservative government under rates (especially for Japan) and the resource
Thatcher is often used in Japan to support the allocation effects they have caused make argu-
benefits of deregulation.　　　　　　　　　　　　ments about small changes m tariffs seem to be
I do not deny that regulation is important in of second-order importance. Some of the 'natu-
particular areas, and that deregulation will ral forces'promotir economic restructuring in
bring about significant benefits to consumers Japan are: the low rates of economic growth in
and improvements in managerial efficiency as the 1990s; the bursting of the speculative bub-
is illustrated in section 3. I am sceptical about ble of the late 1980s; a significant real apprecia-
how large the macro impacts of deregulation tion of the yen; bankruptcies of large firms in
are likely to be and whether their impacts are the construction and finance industries in 1997;
really of a first order magnitude. In his compre-　　　and demographics. For example, two important
hensive analysis of the impact of twenty or so demographic forces are: the rapid aging of the
years of deregulation in the United States (fo-　　　population and the reduction in the absolute
cused particularly on airlines, trucking, rail-　　　size of the population of university age. The
ways and telecommunications), Winston former creates increasing demands for services
(1993) estimates the overall welfare gain from required by the aged like old age homes and
this deregulation to be of the order of $ 36-　　medical assistance, and the latter is inducing a
$ 46 billion per year (1990 dollars), which he welcome and long overdue impetus to more′in-
suggest is something like a 7-9 percent im-　　　tensive competition among universities for stu-
provement in the part of GNP affected by re-　　　dents.
form. However, when compared to total US Over the period from the 1970s to the 1990s,
GNP it is rather small. Based on research by there have been significant changes in the
Morrison and Slesnick (19987), Winston shares of employment and output in various
( 1994) suggests that if optimal deregulation in sectors of the economy. Agriculture's share of
the natural gas industry were implemented, the GDP has fallen from 5.9% in 1970 to 2.1% in
welfare benefit would be of the order of $ 4 bil-　　1993, and its share of total employment has
lion per year (1990 dollars). The suggested fallen from 19.7% in 1970 to 8.0% in 1993.
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Similarly, manufacturing industry's share of political pressure for fiscal stimulation. Part of
GDP has fallen from 34.8% in 1970 to 25.81%　　　the Japanese government's ability to achieve a
in 1993, and its share of total employment has zero budget deficit for the general budget in
fallen from 26.7% in 1970 to 23.1% in 1993.　1990 related to better than expected tax reve-
Reductions in the absolute numbers employed nues during the bubble period (see Asako, Ito
in agriculture and manufacturing industry have and Sakamoto ( 1991) ). The situation did not
occurred. Overseas direct investment by Japa-　　last long so that in 1994 the central govern-
nese firms has moved significant amounts of ment's actual deficit was around 3.5% of GDP.
production overseas particularly in manufac-　　　The aging of the population is also having a sig-
tunng industry. In the five year period between nificant on government spending, and spending
1989 and 1994, the percentage of manufactur-　　　on health in particular (see EPA (1996a)).
ing output produced overseas has risen from
5.7% to 8.6%, with spectacular increases in the　　　3. Privatization
percentage of manufacturing output produced
overseas occurring for petroleum refining In the Japanese debate on privatization, the
(from 0.2% to 5.1%), chemicals (from 5.1%　　　term 'privatisation'has three meanings: first,
to　8.1%) and transport machinery (from the conversion of public corporations into stock
12.6% to 20.3%) (see OECD 1996, p. 30)).　　companies (here referred to as corporati-
Patrick (1995) argues forcefully that natu-　　　sation); second, the reorganization of public
ral forces have and are likely lead to important corporations into 'Chartered Corporations';
changes in the three Japanese-style institutions:　　and, third, a change in the ownership of public
life time employment; main bank-firm rela-　　　enterprises to full (or partial) private owner-
tions; and supply assembler relations. There is ship (here referred to as privatization)
also survey evidence to suggest that these three　　(Uekusa ( 1994a) ). Japan's 'privatisation'ex-
institutions are changing. For example, both perience has involved five organizations: Japan
large and small firms perceive that the impor-　　Airlines (JAL) , and four public corporations,
tance off main banks is lessening (see OECD Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Cor-
(1996)) and a recent survey of firms suggest poration (NTT), Japanese National Railways
they wish to move away from life time employ-　　(JNR) , Japan Tobacco & Salt Public Corpora-
ment (see Kaneko (1996)). The bankruptcy tion (JTS), and the Okinawa Electric Public
of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997 and Corporation (OE). With the exception of OE,
the precarious financial position of some large significant inefficiencies in the other four enti-
banks may lead some companies to further re-　　　ties are commonly suggested as one important
duce their main bank ties.　　　　　　　　　　　　reason for rearranging their internal structure
The public sector is not insulated from these and altering their external environment.
forces. Low (or close to zero) growth rates Uekusa (1994a) suggests that inefficiencies in
create two difficulties in cutting the govern-　　　the running and management of three public
ment deficit - lower tax revenues as well as the corporations, NTT, JNR and JTS, could be
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attributed to factors that include: restrictive ship changes. The process for Okinawa Electric
regulation of management; political interfer-　　is quite different and will be discussed in detail
ence and the politicization of regulation; a lack later. Of the five entities, only two, JAL and
of competition and a rigid government ac-　　Okinawa Electric, are now fully privately
counting system. King (1997) provides a per-　　owned (although in the case of Okinawa Elec-
spective on the Australian privatization experi-　　trie, the Governor of Okinawa is the top share-
ence that has quite a few interesting parallels.　　holder with a shareholding of 4.96%: see Table
In the case of those three public corpora-　　1). While the initial reasons for public owner-
tions, NTT, JNR and JTS, they were first con-　　　ship ofJNR and NTT could be related to prob-
verted into stock companies (or in the case of lems associated with natural monopolies and
JNR a number of stock companies), some development externalities, public ownership of
shares were then sold to the public, and finally JTS would seem to be related to the protection
the shares were listed on the stock exchange. In of an agriculture industry and securing a valu-
addition, the process for all entities (except able and stable revenue source for the govern-
OE) has involved significant management ment over and above the revenue earned by tax-
changes, deregulation, competition and owner-　　ing cigarettes. A brief explanation is given of
Table 1: Okinawa Electric: Shareholders and Lenders
1992　　1993　　1994　　1995　　1996
Governor of Okinawa　　　　　　　　　　　4.96　　　4.96　　　4.96　　　4.96　　　4.96
Bank of Ryukyu　　　　　　　　　　　4.76　　4.80　　4.80　　4.80　　4.80
0.14　　　0.14　　　0.14　　　0.11　　0.08
Bank of Okinawa　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4.77　　　4.77　　　4.77　　　4.77　　　4.77
0.14　　　0.14　　　0.14　　　0.1 1　　0.09
Employees Stockholding Assoc.　　　2.84　　2.88　　3.0 1　3.25　　3.57
Kokuba Gumi　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3.28　　　3.4 1　　3.28　　　3.28　　　3.28
IBJ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3.19　　　3.19　　　3.19　　　3.19　　　3.19
2.26　　　2.05　　1.87　　1.54　　1.34
Nippon Life　　　　　　　　　　　　　2.95　　2.95　　2.95　　2.95　　2.95
Daiichi Life　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2.95　　　2.95　　　2.95　　　2.95　　　2.95
0kinawa Kaiho Bank　　　　　　　　　　　2.30　　　2.30　　　2.30　　　2.30　　　2.30
Daido Accident　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2. 1 9
Ota Norio　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2.17　　　　　　　　2.17　　　2.17
Chase (London)　　　　　　　　　　2.23
SHARES (100s)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　14728　14728　14875
LOANS (billionyen)　　　　　　144　188.7　222.1　242.1　244.4
Source : Toyo Keizai Shmbunsha, Kigyo keiretsu soran, various issues.
Note : For each entity, the top entry for each year is its share holding as a percentage of the issued
shares and the lower entry is its loan share as a percentage of the loans outstanding.
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some of the key features of the privatization of organizational efficiency of the enterprise by
each of the five enterprises.　　　　　　　　　　　reforming labour-management relations, elimi-
Japan Airlines (JAL)　　　　　　　　　　　　nating the politicization of upper management
Japan Airlines was fully privatised in No-　　　appointments, and eliminating the politiciza-
vember 1987 when the government sold its tion of regulation. Prior to 1986, JAL was the
34.54%　shareholding in the company (see sole Japanese airline authorized to carry pas-
Table 2). Uekusa (1994a) suggests that priva-　　　sengers on international routes. With the excep-
tization of JAL aimed at raising the internal tion of All Nippon Airways (ANA) being per-
Table 2: Japan Airlines: Shareholders and Lenders
1985　　1986　　1987　　1988　　1989
Ministry ofFinance　　　　　　　　35.37　34.54　34.54　　0.00　　0.00
Tokio Marine & Fire Insur.　　　　　　2.77　　2.71　　2.71　　3.13　　2.98
Osano Kenji　　　　　　　　　　　　2.27　　2.22
Dowa Accident Insurance　　　　　　　　2.55　　2.49　　2.49　　2.72　　2.59
Industrial Bank of Japan 1.79　1.80　1.80　　2.76　　2.68
26.61　29.52　　21.93　12.77　15.78
Yasuda Accident Insur.　　　　　　　　2.22　　2. 1 6　　2. 1 6　　2.41　　2.30
Employees Shareholders Assoc　　　　2.00　1.6 1　1.32　1.22　1.22
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 1.22　1.25　1.25　1.91　1.86
12.14　11.33　　　7.15　　　6.93　　　3.25
Kinki Nihon Railway 1.07　1.05　1.05　1.26　1.21
Hankyu Railway 1.05　1.03　1.03　1. 10
Nichido Accident Insur.　　　　　　1.28　　1.26　1.26　　1.37　1.3 1
Sumitomo Accident Insur.　　　　　1.40　1.36　1.37　　1.50　1.43
Fukoku Life Insur.　　　　　　　　　1.67　1.63　　1.63　　2.37　　2.33
Nippon Group Insur.　　　　　　1.70　1.56　1.43　　2.39　　2.38
Kokusai Kogyo　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1.97　　2. 1 2　　2.0 1
Nippon Life Insur.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　0.97　　2.20　　2.24
3.90　　2.62
SHARES (100s)　　　　　　　135977 139246 139246 139246 156484
LOANS (・billions)　　　　　　　　79.3　　90.1　140　202.2　208.8
Note : see notes for Table 1.
source : Toyo Keizai Shinbunsha, Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, vanous issues.
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mitted to operate on some international routes produced to foreign produced tobacco is some-
in 1986, most deregulation in the airlines indus-　　thing like three to one, and that revenue from
try comes after the privatization of JAL. Cur-　　the tobacco operations of JTS was used to pro-
rently, the entry of new carriers into the domes-　　vide a substantial cross-subsidization of its salt-
tic market and the expansion of services by ex-　　related activities. The value of this 'monopoly'
isting carriers is heavily restricted. Competition is not altogether obvious since imports of t0-
on international routes has forced significant bacco have been permitted from around the
changes in fares on these routes. Despite the ap-　　time of privatization and imports have a mar-
pearance of a very heavily regulated fare struc-　　ket share over 10%. Contrary to the usual case
ture for domestic travel, Anderson (1996)　　where shareholders are likely to suffer with de-
suggests that, in practice, fares are far less regu-　　regulation, an elimination of the requirement
lated and there is far more competition than is that JT purchase all the expensive domestic to-
often thought. However, actual fares are still bacco would likely to be a great benefit to exist-
quite high compared to US fares (see Ander-　　ing shareholders. In addition, there has been
son (1996)), and average prices and costs of some relaxation of the regulations governing
domestic airline services in Japan are higher the distribution and retailing of tobacco prod-
than the average of 19 country sample of nine-　　ucts. The aims of the new stock company in-
teen advanced countries (see EPA (1995,　　elude 'promoting the healthy development of
p.75)). Capacity constraints at Haneda, Narita the Japanese tobacco industry and securing a
and Itami represent a significant barrier to ex-　　stable source of fiscal revenue'(see Adminis-
pansion of services using these airports. Over trative Management Agency (1992, p. 168)).
the period 1977 to 1996, the number of employ-　　The labour force of the company has been sig-
ees in JAL has been relatively stable around the nificantly reduced over time from 40,699 in
20-21 thousand mark despite a significant ex-　　1981, 36,959 in 1985, 27,833 in 1989 to 24,150
pansion of its operations.　　　　　　　　　　in 1 992 suggesting that significant management
improvements have occurred in the process of
Japan Tobacco (JT)　　　　　　　　　　　preparing for stock exchange listing. Since list-
The Japan Tobacco & Salt Public Corpora-　　ing, the total number of employees of the com-
tion was established in June 1949 with the sole pany seems to have stabilized at around 23,000.
right to produce tobacco (and salt) in Japan.　In October 1994, the government offered one
It was converted to a stock company, Japan To-　　third of the shares in the company for sale to
bacco (JT) , in April 1985 but maintained its the public but only actually succeeded in selling
monopoly on the domestic production of to-　　about 60% of those shares. Despite this failure
bacco. Given the well-known comparative dis-　　　to sell all the shares on offer, the sale raised
advantage that Japan has in the production of　　566.9 billion yen in revenue far in excess of the
agricultural goods, it is unlikely that tobacco is forecast revenue of 278.8 billion yen expected
any different. In fact, Uekusa (1994a, p. 320)　　from selling all the shares on offer. Currently,
suggests that the relative price of domestic the Minister of Finance holds 80.88% of the
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Table 3: Japan Tobacco: Shareholders and Lenders
1994　　　　1995　　　　1996
Minister of Finance lOO　　　　　8 1.88　　　　80.88
Employees Stockholding Assoc.　　　　　　　　　　　　　0.46　　　　0.66
Mitsubishi Trust Bank 0.24　　　　　0.44
Sumitomo Trust 】〕ank 0.24　　　　　0.32
Toyo Shintaku Bank 0.2 1　　　　0.28
Fuji Bank 0.2 1　　　　0.45
0.16
Dauchi Kangyo Bank 0.20　　　　0.44
Daiichi Life Insurance 0. 1 8　　　　　0.39
Industrial Bank of Japan 0. 1 8　　　　0.28
Norin Chukin 0.18
0.25
Sakura Bank 0.23
Nippon Life Insurance
26.ll
SHARES ( 100s)　　　　　　　　　　　　　2000　　　　2000　　　　2000
LOANS (¥billion)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　11.7　　　11.5
Note : see notes for Table 1.
Source : Toyo Keizai Shinbunsha, Kigyo Keiretsu Soγan, various issues.
outstanding shares in the company (see Table determine if the corporatisation in 1985
3).　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　brought about any significant reduction in cor-
Akioka (1993a) provides a very interesting porate costs by testing the significance of a
attempt to measure the impact of privatization zero-one dummy in the translog cost function.
(in the form of the conversion of a public corp No statistically significant reduction in costs is
oration into a stock company [corporatisation] )　　observed (one equation suggests costs rise and
on firm behaviour by estimating a translog cost another suggests costs fall but neither effect is
function for Japan Tobacco that covers both statistically significant at any reasonable sig-
the pre-privatization and post-privatization re-　　nificance level). It should be noted that: no al-
gimes. His sample of annual data runs from lowance is made for possible technical innova-
1955 to 1989 giving a total of 45 observations tion in the tobacco processing that may have
but importantly excludes the period when the affected costs; only the cost function (but not
shares were sold. Akioka (1993a) attempts to the share equations for the input factors) was
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estimated; and if the company is in fact mini-　　anticipated revenue of 6-700 billion yen, only
mizing costs after corporatisation and not just　　63% of the shares outstanding were actually
before then it is possible that not just total costs sold. All revenue from these share sales is to be
but the usage of factor inputs, labour, capital used to reduce the outstanding liabilities of the
and tobacco leaf, may have been affected.　　　JNR Settlement Corporation estimated at
around 28 trillion yen! The Settlement Corpo-
Japan National Railways (JNR)　　　　　　ration still holds 37.94 0f the shares m East Ja-
JNR's poor managerial performance prior to pan (see Table 4) and 37% of the shares in
its corporatisation is usually attributed to: the West Japan. Proceeds of sales of surplus land
lack of incentives for efficient management,　　held by the Settlement Corporation are also to
strong labour unions, JNR's huge size, political be used to payoff the existing liabilities of the
intervention and regulation (see Fukui Corporation. Any reasonable estimate of the
(1992), Uekusa (1994a) and Takeuchi et al.　　value of the assets held by the Settlement Cor-
(1997)). JNR was making very large annual poration suggests they fall significantly below
losses around 2 trillion yen/year and had a the outstanding liabilities of the Corporation.
huge accumulated debt of over 20 trillion yen.　　Significant reductions have been achieved in
Most lines were running at a loss.　　　　　　　the total work force of the JNR group which is
The corporatisation of the JNR in April consistent with Fukui's (1992) detailed study
1987 involved splitting the public corporation of the JNR privatization experience indicating
into nine entities: six passenger railway compa-　　significant improvements in managerial em-
nies each operating in particular geographic re-　　　ciency occurred prior to 1992. EPA surveys
gions, a freight company operating nation-wide,　　consistently find that train fares are higher in
the Shinkansen Holding Organization, and the Japan than in the United States (see Asahi
JNR Settlement Corporation. The six regional Shinbun ( 1996) ). Political interference with
companies are JR East, JR West, JR Hokkaido,　　respect to the investment plans are still an lm-
JR Shikoku Railway, JR, Tokai and JR Kyu-　　　portant problem as is illustrated by recent deci-
shu. The JNR Settlement Corporation origi-　　　sions regarding the construction of new
nally held all the shares in the other companies,　　shinkansen lines.
together with surplus real estate and a major
portion of JNR's debt. To date, only shares in Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT)
East Japan, West Japan and JR. Tokai have Takano (1992) suggests that the following
been listed on the stock exchange in October factors were important in leading to the privati-
1993, October 1996 and October 1997, respec-　　　zation of NTT: sizeable government deficits;
tively. The initial share issues for East Japan the realization of universal telephone services;
and West Japan raised 732.2 billion yen and significant technical innovation; and manage-
480.0 billion, respectively. Although the initial ment ine爪ciency (see also Uekusa (1994a) ).
issue of West Japan was intended to dispose of NTT was converted into a stock company in
85%　of the outstanding shares with an April 1985 and listed on the stock exchange in
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Table 4: East Japan Railway: Shareholders and Lenders
1993　　　1994　　1995　　　1996
JNR Settlement Corp.　　　　　　　　100　　39.43　　38.25　　37.94
Employees Stockholding Assoc.　　　　　　　　　1.73　　　2.45　　　2.82
Mitsubishi Trust Bank 0.97　　1.7 1　　2 52
4.53　　　　3.87　　　　3.77
Industrial Bank of Japan 1.50　　1.50
5.02　　　　4.94　　　　5.02
Fuji Bank 1.50　　1.50　　1.50
4,7 1　　　4.75　　　　4.93
Dauchi Kangyo Bank 0.75　　　1.50　　1.55
4.67　　　　4.7 1　　　4.93
Mitsubishi Bank 0.65　　　1.50　　　1.50
4.55　　　　4.59　　　　4.93
Sanwa Bank 1.25　　　1.50
3.81　　　3.84　　　　4.03
Mitsubishi Trust Tokkin 0.60　　　1. 14
Mitsui Trust Bank 0.7 1　　　0.9 1　　1.09
4.06　　　　3.84　　　　3.77
Dauchi Life Insur.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1.12
2.84　　　　2.82　　　　2.59
Yasuda Kmsen 0.65
Sumitomo Life lnsur.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　0.54
Sumitomo Trust Bank 0.54
1.60　　　1.45　　　1.33
Japan Development Bank
24.68　　　26.90　　　27.80
SHARES ( 100s)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4000　　　4000　　　4000
LOANS (¥billion)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1232　　1275　　1349
Note : see notes for Table 1.
Source : Toyo Keizai Shinbunsha, Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.various issues.
February 1987. Three sales of government held service operators, and 90 mobile service opera-
shares over the period 1986-8 raised a total of tors (see EPA (1996a, p. 366)). Consumers
lO trillion yen in revenue that was primarily have benefited greatly as a result of significant
used to reduce the outstanding amount of gov-　　real reductions in rates for long distance, mo-
eminent bonds. The sales have reduced the gov-　　　bile, and international services. One common
emment's share holdings to 65.53% (see Table criticism of the NTT privatization is the failure
5). At the same time or later, some competition to undertake a rebalancing of rates for local
was introduced for long distance, local and eel-　　　calls vis-a-vis long distance calls (see, for ex-
Mar services so that now in addition to NTT,　　ample, Takano (1992)). The EPA (1996a, p.
there are 3 long distance operators, 16 loca1　　368) estimates that the combination of
1 998年3月　　　　　　　　Economic and Public Sector Restructuring in Japan　　　　　　　　　　　　49
Table 5: NTT: Shareholders and Lenders
1986　1987　1988　1989　1990　1992　1994　1995　1996
MinisterofFinance 100.00　91.54　77.53　67.46　66.25　65.78　65.62　65.59　65.53
Sumitomo Life Insurance 0. 1 6　　0.33　　0.46　　0.46　　0.47　　0.46　　0.43　　0.34
2.54　　　　　　　3.54
Sumitomo Trust 】〕ank 0. 14　　0.40　　0.56　　0.36　　0.41　0.34　　0.38　　0.45
1.34　1.87　1.79　　2.40　　2.84　1.93　1.31　0.71
ToyoTrustBank 0.14　0.35　0.57　0.47　0.33　0.22　0.29　0.29
0.87　1.21　1.15　1.54　1.71　1.04　　0.69　　0.21
Chuo Trust Bank 0. 13　　0.28　　0.32　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　0.32　　0.32
Yasuda Trust Bank 0. 1 1　0.36　　0.43　　　　　　　　　　　0.23
1.08　1.55　1.46　1.85　　2.05　1.22　　0.77　1.09
Mitsubishi Trust Bank 0. 10　　0.56　　0.71　0.53　　0.69　　0.5 1　0.56　　0.52
1.37　1.78　1.60　　2.24　　3.26　　2.65　　2.06　　2.62
Yasuda Trust Kmsen 0. 10
Mitsui Trust Bank 0.09　　0.25　　　　　　　　　　　0.29　　0.30　　0.30　　0.27
5.96　　3.23　　2.93　　3.37　　3.04　　0.98　　0.90　　0.7 1
Employees Shareholding Assoc.　　　　　　　0.08　　　　　0.36　0.51　0.82　0.97　0.97　1.02
NipponLifeInsurance 0.28　0.51　0.54　0.53　0.53　0.53　0.53
7.84　　5.31　5.20　　5.57　　5.65　　6.92　　6.18　　6.38
Export-Import Bank
7.89　　2.40　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7.13　11.76　11.91
Japan Securities Settlement 0.46　　　　　0.30
Dauchi Life Insurance 0.50　　0.50　　0.50　　0.47　　0.47　　0.46
3.90　　　　　　　5.10
Norm Chukin 0.48　　0.37
4.87　　　　　　3.31　2.42　1.93
SHARES (100s)　　　　　　　　　15600 15600 15600 15600 15600 15600 15600 15600 15912
LOANS (¥billion)　　　　　　　　　　　　172　　566　　681　801　868　　715　　736　　915
Note : see notes for Table 1.
Source : Toyo Keizai Shmbunsha, Kigyo Keiretsu Soran,vanous issues.
corporatisation, deregulation and competition NTT more efficient, Lincoln (1996, p. 250)
have also led to significant increases in both suggests that NTT is still a 'quagmire of ineffi-
capital and labour productivity in NTT (see ciency'. The significantly higher cost of long
also Takano (1992)). A notional 'break up'of distance phone calls and the base rate for cellu-
NTT into two regional local carriers covering lar phones in Japan compared to the United
East Japan and West Japan has recently an-　　　States and the United Kingdom found in a re-
nounced.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　cent EPA survey is suggestive of there being
While Uekusa (1994a) argues that the pri-　　further room for efficiency improvement (see
vatization ofNTT (and other public corpora-　　Asahi Shinbun (1996)). Baily (1993) also
tions) has been extremely successful in making suggests that productivity in the Japanese
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telecommunications significantly lags behind August demand) to maximum August demand
that in the United States.　　　　　　　　　　　at 24.2% is more than double any of the other
Okinawa Electric (OE)　　　　　　　　　　power utilities (see Agency of Natural Re-
An investigation of Okinawa Electric high-　　sources and Energy (1996)). Unlike the other
lights many of the interrelated aspects of eco-　　　power utilities which have access to the na-
nomic regulation, amakudari, privatization,　　tional power gnu and so can utilize excess ca-
and rationalization of government institutions.　　pacity in other parts of the country, Okinawa
The American occupation of Okinawa from Electric has no such possibilities'
the end of World War II until May 1972 makes On the return of Okinawa to Japan, three op-
the history of Okinawa Electric quite different tions were considered for the generation of
from the history of the other nine major power power that was previously performed by
companies that were all established in the early Ryukyu Electric: the establishment of a pub-
1950s. Geography is also important in two licly owned company that would essentially
ways: Okinawa is physically separated from the take over completely the functions and respon-
rest of Japan; and Okinawa is itself made up of sibilities of Ryukyu Electric; the merging of
40 or so islands that are also physically sepa-　　　Ryukyu Electric with Kyushu Electric; and the
rated by quite significant distances. Given the merging of Ryukyu Electric with Tokyo Elec-
obligation imposed by Article 1 8 of the Electric trie. The first option was adopted.
Power Business Law on a power utility to pro-　　　　Okinawa Electric was established as a stock
vide electricity to all users in its area (see company on 15　May 1972, the day of
Kishimoto (1994)), this geography affects the Okinawa's return to Japan, with capital pro-
extent to which it is possible for Okinawa Elec-　　　vided by the Minister of Finance and the Gov-
trie to reap the economies of scale that are sug-　　ernor of Okinawa Prefecture, and those two m-
gested to exist in electric power generation (see dividuals as the only shareholders. In 1976,
Jorgenson (1986, pp. 1893-1897) and Sing separate electricity transmission companies
(1987)). It also necessarily means there is a were acquired and absorbed into Okinawa Elec-
significant degree of cross subsidization by us-　　trie making it the sole electric power utility in
ers on the main island of Okinawa of those us-　　　Okinawa. In 1988, most of the shares in the
ers in outlying islands where electricity genera-　　company were sold to the public and shares
tion is typically performed on a loss running were listed on the over-the-counter market (see
basis. Okinawa's current total electricity supply Suzuki ( 1987, pp. 138-139) for a discussion of
capability of 1720 mW is one third the size of this market). In February 1992, Okinawa Elec-
its next smallest company, Hokkaido Electric,　　trie's shares were listed on the second board of
and one nineteenth the size of the largest com-　　　the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
pany, Tokyo Electric. In addition, it reserve ca-　　　Following a similar approach to Akioka s
pability (- supply capability - maximum　　(1993a) analysis of the impact of corporati-.-・・.-　　-　
1. 0kinawa Electric is also engaged in research and development on new energy sources like solar and wind power at its fa-
cilities on Miyakojima.
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sation on Japan Tobacco, Akioka (1993b) at-　　shareholder control over managers, the manag-
tempts to determine if the full public sell off of ers probably have a much freer hand in the run-
the shares in Okinawa Electric in 1988 had any nine of the company.
influence on the company's cost structure.　　　The conventional story about firm financing
While there is evidence that costs did fall to in Japan centres on the main bank which puts
some extent after full privatization, the reduc-　　　together a de facto loan syndicate for a firm.
tion is not found to be statistically significant.　　The main bank is typically the largest lender to
There is also some evidence that economies of the firm, the largest shareholder among the
scale in power generation are observed after banks, and for large firms plays an important
privatization but not before.　　　　　　　　　　role in assisting firms when they get into dis-
Given the OECD's recent recommendation tress (see Aoki and Patrick (1994)). Japan
that regulatory reform of the power industry does not have an active takeover market and
include the separation of generation and trans-　　　the external share market does not appear to
mission of electricity, Akioka's (1993b) find-　　　provide a strong discipline on management of
ings about Okinawa Electric's acquisition and firms, although there is evidence that manage-
absorption of the main electricity transmission rial remuneration and turnover is related to the
companies in Okinawa in 1976 are particularly financial state of the firm (see Kaplan ( 1994)
relevant. He finds that there is, not surprisingly,　　and Kaplan and Minton ( 1994) ).
an increase in Okinawa Electric's costs but does Tablesト5 provide details of the top share-
not examine whether they are less than or holders (and their loan shares) in Okinawa
greater than the costs of Okinawa Electric and Electric, Japan Airlines, Japan Tobacco, East
the transmission companies separately.　　　　　Japan Railway and NTT, respectively. East Ja-
pan Railway is probably the closest to the
Common Themes　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　'main bank'firm pattern with five city banks
With the exception of Okinawa Electric, the among the top ten shareholders and the order-
sale of shares in each of the other four stock ing of loan shares closely following the order-
companies has created an extremely number of ing of their shareholdings (Table 4). Japan
shareholders in each company. At March 1996,　　Airlines would also appear to follow the stan-
NTT had 1,569,988 shareholders, East Japan dard main bank story with the Industrial 】〕ank
had 418,255 shareholders, JAL had 161,632　　　0f Japan being the largest shareholder and the
shareholders and JT had 118,344 shareholders.　largest lender among the banks (Table 2).
Okinawa Electric only has 7105 shareholders.　　Other bank loans apart from Dai-ichi Kangyo
In terms of shareholder control, it is to be ex-　　　are relatively small and JAL seems to have a
pected that shareholder control was much very diversified pattern of borrowing. It is
firmer in the pre-privatised days where in fact worth noting that JAL's amount of loans out-
there was only one shareholder. In the post pri-　　　standing increased significantly in the year of
vatization days where there are many share-　　　complete privatization. Despite Japan Tobacco
holders which presumably leads to weaker having next to no bank lending, three city
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banks and the Industrial Bank of Japan appear served for some of the other electric power utili-
among its top ten shareholders (Table 3). Al-　　ties, they do not appear to be quite so strong2. Sec-
though Fuji Bank, Daiichi Kangyo Bank and ond, Okinawa Electric is listed on the second
Sumitomo have shares of NTT's loans of 5%,　　board (and was initially listed on the over-the-
5% and 4%, respectively, neither they nor any counter market) whereas all the others were
other city bank appear among the top ten initially listed on the first board of the Tokyo
shareholders of NTT (Table 5). NTT also has Stock Exchange so the extent to which the
a very diversified pattern of borrowing and stock market provides a disciplining mecha-
NTT's borrowings have increased massively in nism on manager behaviour may differ signifi-
the post-privatization era. It is interesting that cantly. Third, unlike most Japanese companies,
the two entities with either a minority govern-　　　the principal source of funds for Okinawa Elec-
ment holding or no government holding, East trie is the Okinawa Development Finance Cor-
Japan and JAL, appear to be the closest to the poration, a government finance agency under
standard pattern for 'main bank'style firms.　　　the auspices of the Okinawa Development
Okinawa Electric is quite different in several Agency3. Reliance on 'policy determined'loans
respects. First, it has very strong regional ties as can create problems when, for example, be-
among its top ten shareholders six of the agents cause business is good the power company does
are Okinawa (the Governor); the Banks of not wish to increase its loans from the Finance
Okinawa and Ryukyu; the Employees Stock Corporation but the Finance Corporation in its
Holding Association; Kokuba Gumi, the larg-　　budget has already allocated funds for that pur-
est construction company in Okinawa; and pose. One of the main bank's tasks is to monitor
Okinawa Kaiho (see Table 1). While these re-　　its customers. It would be interesting to analyse
gional associations of shareholders can be ob-　　how the monitoring and screening performed
2. For example, the City of Kobe is the third largest shareholder in Kansai Electric; the Foundation to Promote Yamaguchi
Prefecture and the Bank of Hiroshima are, respectively, the top and number eight shareholders in Chugoku Electric;
Toyama Prefecture, Hokuriku Bank and Hokkoku Bank appear among the top ten shareholders in Hokuriku Electric; the
One Hundred and Fourteenth Bank, Iyo Bank and Kochi Prefecture appear among the top ten shareholders in Shikoku
Electric; the Bank of Fukuoka appears among the top ten shareholders in Kyushu Electric; and Hokkaido Takushoku
Bank appears among the top ten shareholders in Hokkaido Electric.
3. The Okinawa Development Finance Corporation was established on 15 May 1972 for the purpose of supplying long-term
capital to develop industry in Okinawa, and the provision of funds for housing, people engaged in forestries, fishing and
agriculture, small businesses, and environmental sanitation. It can provide supplementary funds for investments made by
financial institutions or do the lending directly itself. From the standpoint of administrative reform, it is interesting to
note that the Okinawa Development Finance Corporation undertakes in Okinawa the tasks that require six finance insti-
tutions in the rest of Japan (excluding Hokkaido and northern Japan where there is a similar institution, the Hokkaido
Tohoku Development Finance Corporation) : the Japan Development Bank, the People's Finance Corporation, the Housing
Loan Corporation, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation, the Small Business Finance, and the En-
'ironmental Sanitation Business Finance Corporation (see Administrative Management Agency (1992, p. 128-129)). This
suggests the strong possibility of the existence of economies of scope across these six institutions. While the average
prefectural per capita income in Okinawa, 2.1 million yen in 1993, is clearly the lowest of all prefectures, is this Okinawa
Development Finance Corporation the best way to provide funds to lift the average standard of living? Funds provided
by the Corporation to Okinawa Electric are at subsidized rates. About ninety percent of the Finance Corporations Funds
come from the Trust Fund Bureau Account and the rest come from postal life assurance and annuity funds (Suzuki
(1987, p. 289, Table 5.27)). The majority of funds for the Trust Fund Bureau come from the Postal Savings system (see
suzuki (1987, p. 277, Table 5.22)).
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by these government finance corporations com-　　positions in industry (or in public corporations
pare with the monitoring and screening of pri-　　established by the National government under
vate financial institutions. The funds that special laws) following their (possibly forced
power utilities typically require are for long-　　early) retirement. As this practice has been
term investment and for this purpose they need perceived as one indicator of close ties between
sources of long term funds. Here, Okinawa the regulated firms in the private sector and the
Electric is in a quite different position to the regulating agency, it has been the focus of a
rest of electric power utilities especially since it great deal of public attention recently after the
is only listed on the second board of the Tokyo scandal with AIDS infected blood products in-
Stock Exchange. According to the Japan Bond volving the Ministry of Health and Welfare
Rating Association, while the nine large elec-　　and Green Cross, the Jusen bad loans problem
trie power utilities all have AAA long-term that eventually required a large infusion of pub-
credit ratings in 1995 and all seven power com-　lie funds, and a bribery scandal involving a for-
panies with commercial paper (CP) ratings mer Ministry of Transport official after his re-
have the top Al + rating, Okinawa Electric is tirement to become head of the Kansai Interna-
not eligible to issue either long term bonds or tional Airport Corporation. It is important to
cPs.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　consider the potential costs and benefits of this
My reading of the evidence for JAL, JNR practice to several different groups; the dis-
and NTT is that the overall package of patching ministry and the employees in that
corporatisation, deregulation and the introduc-　　ministry; the recipient firm and the employees
tion of competition has led to significant im-　　in that firm; other firms in the same industry;
provements in managerial efficiency and bene-　　and society as a whole. The research done to
fits to consumers even if there is still some way date typically focuses on one particular group
to go. However, I wonder about the extent of only. One important missing element in argu-
efficiency gains that arise from the share sell-　　ments about amakudari to date is what are the
offs particularly for two entities, JT and NTT,　incentive mechanisms facing the dispatched in-
when the government retains significant major-　　dividual to work in the dispatching ministry's
ity holdings. Neither the share market nor the interest; the recipient firm's interest, or their
financial system are likely to provide strong in-　　own interest. A similar issue arises m relation
centives for improvements in managerial effi-　　to dispatches of directors from main banks to
ciency in these cases and there is (probably)　　private firms.
no real threat of bankruptcy.　　　　　　　　　　The National Public Service Law provides
that, in principle, government employees are
4. Amakudari not permitted to be re-employed by a private
profit making company for a two year period
Amakudari (descent from heaven) refers to after their retirement from their ministry or
the practice of Japanese government officials agency if they had close relationships with the
aged between 50 and 60 moving to high company in the five years prior to their
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Table 6: Amakudari Approved by the National Personnel Agency
BoardofAudit
National Police Agency
Hokkaido Development Agency
Economic Planning Agency
Science and Technology Agency
Environment Agency
Defence Facilities Administration Agency
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Finance　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　59
National Tax Agency
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Health and Welfare
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1 6
Food Agency
Forestry Agency
Fisheries Agency
Ministry of International Trade and lndustry　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1 7
Natural Resources and Energy Agency
Patents Agency
Ministry of Transport 1 1
Maritime Safety Agency
Meterological Agency
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　12
Ministry of Construction　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1 6
Ministry of Home Affairs
Total　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1 89
Sorce : Toyo Keizai (1996), Seikai-kancho jinjii roku {Personnel Record of the Political World and
Bureaucracy), Tokyo.
Note : These Amakudari refer to cases in 1995 where the reemployment is with a profit making en-
terpnse and requires the approval of the National Personnel Authority under article 103 (3) of the the
National Public Service Law.
retirement. Re-employment with such firms is managing director).
possible if the National Personnel Authority The fixed final retirement age of 60 (five
approves and this approval needs to be obtained years before the pension age of 65) , the role of
on a case by case basis. Table 6 provides details seniority in promotions and the declining num-
of amakudan in 1995 to profit making enter-　　　ber of positions as officials rise up the ladder
prises where the approval of the National Peト　　　make it inevitable that there will be a large
sonnel Authority was given. A significant num-　　　number of elite bureaucrats who require jobs
ber of the Ministry of Finance amakudari are outside their Ministry. Recent academic re-
to Shinkin banks. Of the 17 MITI amakudari,　　search on amakudari has focused on both de-
three went to energy related companies, Kansai mand and supply side factors associated with
Electric (as an adviser [komon] ) , Tokyo Elec-　　this practice (see Fujiwara and Iemori ( 1994) ,
trie (as a an adviser to their Technical Devel-　　Iemori and Fujiwara (1994), Inoki (1995),
opment Headquarters), and Daito Gas (as a and Schaede (1995)).
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Amakudari can be observed still in each of performance as well as by the status of the mm-
the privatised entities discussed in section 3.　istry. Inoki's empirical study deals only with
The current board of JAL has one retired em-　　　amakudari to public corporations and finds
ployee from each of the Ministry of Posts and that the higher the final post in the ministry,
Telecommunications, the Ministry of Trans-　　the better the amakudari position in the public
port, and the Management and Coordination corporation and the longer the amakudan stay
Agency. Three members of the board of Japan in that public corporation. By increasing the
Tobacco are former Ministry of Finance em-　　expected value of a stay in the Ministry, Inoki
ployees. Three members of the board of East suggests amakudari provides a mechanism to
Japan are former bureaucrats from the Minis-　　attract better quality workers into the ministry.
try of Transport and one is from the National However, this argument cuts two ways. In the
police Agency. Four members of the board of company or public corporation that accepts the
NTT are former bureaucrats from the Ministry amakudari the incentive story works in the re-
of Posts and Telecommunications, one is from verse direction. That is, by filling one position
the Ministry of Finance, and one is from the with an outsider the opportunity cost is that an
Audit Board. Again Okinawa Electric is inter-　　insider cannot be promoted, so this may affect
esting because it has amakudari from both the the personnel competition within the accepting
national and prefectural governments. For ex-　　　firm and the quality of workers attracted into
ample, currently the chairman of the company the firm. This argument obviously extends to
is a former vice-governor of Okinawa and the cases of "amakudari" like transfers for private
president of the company comes from MITI firms where the parent company transfers a
(see Toyo Keizai (1997, p. 574)). According worker to a senior position in a subsidiary.
to the company's annual report for fiscal year How important the suggested competition ef-
1988, there were fourteen members of the fects and intake effects in either the ministry or
board with three former vice-governors as the recipient firm is an important but as yet
chairman, president and director [concurrently uninvestigated empirical question. A back of
with being vice-governor] , and one executive the envelope calculation of the expected present
director from MITI who had previously had value ofa salary differential to be earnt in 30 or
four years experience with the Okinawa Devel-　　　so years time suggests it is likely to be small;
opment Agency.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　and subject to a great deal of uncertainty. As a
Inoki (1995) emphasizes the importance of result, it is probably safe to conjecture that the
amakudari as an incentive mechanism that pro-　　　effects of the existence of the amakudan on in-
motes effort by bureaucrats and competition take quality into a ministry are likely to be rela-
among bureaucrats in the dispatching ministry.　　tively small.
Since the amakudari is organised by the person-　　　　On the other hand, Schaede ( 1995) focuses
nel office within the bureaucrat's ministry,　　on the 'demand'for amakudari by private busi-
Inoki treats it as a form of deferred compensa-　　　ness and the importance of regulation through
tion whose value is determined by on the job non-codified administrative guidance. The
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importance of the former bureaucrats for the are in very important positions, one is president
recipient firm is suggested to be in their ability　　(shacho) and four are vice-president (fuku-
to obtain favourable firm-specific administra-　　shacho). In addition, the vice-president of
tive guidance and to gain information that will Kansai Electric is an amakudari from JETRO,
provide a firm-specific edge in intra-industry an institution under MITI's influence. Kyushu
competition. Schaede finds that the industries Electric has one amakudari from the People's
that hire the most amakudari are those that are Finance Corporation (Kokumin kinyu koko,
the subject of external constraints like trade an agency under the auspices of MOF). The
agreements controlled by the ministry in electric power industry would appear to fit in
charge of the industry. Evidence is provided　　- very nicely with Schaede's (1995) story given
that industries subject to a specific industry MITI's role in rate setting and the
law, for example, investment banking and in-　　licensing/ approval provisions relating to new
surance, do not show a pattern of hiring former power stations, etc. for individual power com-
bureaucrats. One particularly interesting result panies. Of the nine major gas companies listed
is that the number of amakudari to large firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Tokyo Gas,
has increased over the last decade despite the Osaka Gas, Toho Gas, Hokkaido Gas, Hi-
general trend towards deregulation and the roshima Gas, Saibu Gas, Hokuriku Gas, Keiyo
conventional wisdom that administrative guid-　　　Gas and Chubu Gas), five have amakudari
ance is becoming less important over time from MITI and one has an amakudan from the
(particularly with the passing of the Adminis-　　Japan Development Bank (Keiyo Gas).
trative Procedures Act in 1994). Even though Examining the private railway companies re-
there has been no government ownership in veals that for the seventeen companies listed on
JAL since November 1987, the presence of an the first board of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
amakudari from the Ministry of Transport is seven either have an amakudan directly from
consistent with Schaede's hypothesis given the the Ministry of Transport or an agency under
importance of the Ministry of Transport in de-　　　the Ministry of Transport's jurisdiction, like
termining expansions of domestic services.　　　　the former JR, the Railway Construction Pub-
Schaede (1995) does not explicitly examine lie Corporation or the Teito Rapid Transit
energy related amakudari. An examination of Authority. In fact, Tobu and Seibu have two
the Almanac of Firm Groups in 1997 (see such amakudari; in the case of Tobu one of
Toyo Keizai Shinbunsha (1997)) indicates them is as President. In other companies, there
that of the ten electric power companies, seven are also amakudari from the National Police
companies (Tokyo Electric, Chubu Electric,　　Agency (perhaps as a countermeasure against
Hokuriku Electric, Tohoku Electric, Shikoku gangster influence) , the Ministry of Construe-
Electric, Hokkaido Electric and Okinawa Elec-　　　tion, the Bank of Japan, the Forestry Agency,
trie) have amakudari on their boards of direc-　　　and the Ministry of Finance. In total, nine of
tors from MITI, the ministry with direct re the seventeen companies have amakudari with
sponsibility for them. Typically these amakudari Fuji Kyuko having three. Looking at the
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privatised firms taken up in section 3, a similar the Ministry of Finance to two groups of finan-
examination of firms in the same industry re-　　　cial institutions, second tier regional banks and
veals that ANA has three amakudari, one each Shinkin banks, provides no evidence to reject
from the Japan Development Bank, The Minis-　　any of the five hypotheses. Hoshi (1997) also
try of Transport and the Ministry of Posts and highlights the communication and intervention
Telecommunications. The two most recently possibilities made available by the existence of
established long distance telephone companies the amakudari system
are DDI and Japan Telecom. DDI has Implicit in Inoki's (1995) hypothesis is the
amakudari from the Ministry of Posts and assumption that salary conditions in public cor-
Telecommunications (president), MITI (ex-　　　porations are significantly better than what
ecutive director [senmu] , and their competitive could be achieved by the bureaucrat by going
rival NTT! Japan Telecom also has an directly to a private company. Taking this as
amakudari from Ministry of Posts and Tele-　　　given, his evidence suggests that announced
communications (executive director) , JR, JR plans to eliminate or rationalize government
East, JR Shikoku, JR Tokai, JR Hokkaido, and corporations by reducing the expected life time
their competitive rival NTT!　　　　　　　　　　benefit of becoming a public servant, could, in
Fujiwara and Iemori (1994) and Iemori and the long-term, alter the quality of public ser-
Fujiwara (1994) suggest a number of (not vants and reduce the supply of individuals
necessarily mutually exclusive) demand and wanting to become public servants. Schaede's
supply explanations for the amakudari phe-　　(1995) evidence suggests that deregulation re-
nomena: (a) as a mechanism to overcome stricting or eliminating administrative guid-
some of the differences between private sector ance (or the elimination of voluntary export
and public sector salaries and retirement ages arrangements) would significantly affect the
[conditions hypothesis]; (b) in a regulated en-　　demand from private sector firms for
vironment, a failure to accept a retired govern-　　　amakudari. The elimination or rationalization
ment official may result in unfavourable ad-　　　of government corporations would also increase
ministrative treatment later [threat of penalty the supply ex-bureaucrats going directly to
hypothesis] ; (c) the skills that the bureaucrats firms. Both these supply and demand factors
acquire during their time in a Ministry are of are likely to reduce the conditions offered by
value themselves to the private firms [ability private sector firms to former bureaucrats, and
hypothesis] ; (d) the amakudari may provide a reduce the life-time rewards to future potential
signal about the safety of the private firm (par-　　bureaucrats. In the longer-term, this could dra-
ticularly in the financial industry) [rescue hy-　　matically alter the quality of individuals in the
pothesis] ; and (e) amakudari may provide a public service.
means for the bureaucracy to monitor private
firms and obtain more truthful information　　　5. Conclusion
[monitoring hypothesis]. Fujiwara and
lemon's statistical analysis of amakudari from Significant deregulation has occurred in
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many areas in Japan already and there are areas
like public utilities, lotteries and pachinko QDt - ai + a2PGt/ P, + a3PE, / P,
parlours where further deregulation could　　　　　　　+ a4Yt/ Pt　+ ut　　　　　　(1),
bring about significant benefits. This paper has
sought to raise questions about: the size of the where QDt is the per capita demand for gaso-
macroeconomic impact of deregulation; the line, PGt is the price of gasoline, Pt is the gen-
relative size of the resource flows generated by eral price level, PEt is the price of an energy
natural restructuring'compared to deregula-　　　substitute, Yt is nominal per capita income and
tion; and the efficiency benefits of sales of stock ut is a disturbance. On the supply side, assume
in government corporations.　　　　　　　　　　　that the supply for gasoline products is given by
APPENDIX: ABOLITION OF TOKUSEKIHO QS, - b, + b2PG, / P, + b3W, / P,
+ b4R,/Pt + b5PO,/ Pt + v,　(2)
Tokusekiho was a law that required firms
wishing to import crude oil and petroleum where QSt is the per capita supply for gasoline,
products to obtain a licence from the Minister Wt is the wage rate, Rt is the cost of capital, P
of International Trade and Industry and to Ot is the price of crude oil, and vt is a distur-
have facilities for storing crude oil for a mini-　　　bance. Assuming demand equals supply and
mum specified period to avoid disruption to the solving for the reduced form of PGt / Pt gives
domestic market if foreign supplies were cut for
some reason. The law was abolished from 1 PG,/ P, - ci + CJPO, /P, + c3PE, /P,
April 1996. Newspaper reports often suggest　　　　　　　　+ c4Y, / Pt + c5Wi/ Pt
that recent falls in gasoline prices are due to　　　　　　　　+ c6Rt/Pt + wt　　　　(3)
abolition of the Tokusekiho. Prices of gasoline,
oil and kerosene over the period from January where wt is a disturbance. Given the expected
1993 to early 1997 are displayed in Figure 1.　　signs of the parameters are a2 <C 0 (downward
From the Figure, it can be seen that over the sloping demand curve), b2 J> 0 (upward slop-
period April 1994 to March 1997 gasoline ing supply curve), b5 <. 0 (increasing input
prices have been trending downwards whereas prices lead to lower output), and c2 -b5 /(a2-
the price of crude oil, the primary input to b2), it is expected that c2 ,> 0. That is, rises in
gasoline production, has been rising. This sug-　　the prices of inputs can be expected to lead to
gests there is something else (like the abolition rises in the final price of gasoline products. Fig-
of the Tokusekiho) that explains the down-　　　ure 1 indicates that oil prices and gasoline
ward movement of gasoline prices.　　　　　　　prices have been moving in opposite directions
To examine whether the abolition had any since April 1994.
effect on the price of gasoline a simple demand Estimates of (3) using data over the period
and supply model was postulated. The demand January 1993 to February 1997 consistently
for gasoline products is assumed to be given by produced equations where, contrary to
:::3(ll1
straightlin::4MZl
representcriti:95M31996M45"19
alboundsat5"/signLficance1:7112
uel
Abolition
Figure2:CUSUMTestofReducedFormEquationforGasolinePrices
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expectations, the estimated c2　was positive.
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